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Abstract
The falsification of hardcopy documents is a common
problem these days. Numerous industrial and scientific so-
lutions have been proposed to prevent these falsifications.
In this paper, we want to study the security of the two level
QR code which is constructed using specific textured pat-
terns that are sensitive to print-and-scan impact. Such code
is a good candidate because it generalizes several concepts
from several codes. We take a falsifier point of view that
aims to reconstruct the two level QR code and to fool the au-
thentication system detector. As the two level QR code con-
tains sets of the same textured patterns, the opponent has
access to different printed-and-scanned versions of these
textured patterns. These sets of patterns can be used for
structure estimation. Several local strategies for pattern es-
timation are suggest in this paper. The experimental results
show that the increasing number of printed-and-scanned
patterns cannot improve the estimation results.
1. Introduction
The number of hardcopy documents that are processed
by administration and authority centers increases every day
and these documents cannot always be replaced by their nu-
meric version (for example, the validity of an ID document
is also linked to the physical object). In the same time the
number of administrative document falsification increases
with accessibility of qualitative reproduction devices (such
as high resolution printers and scanners). Therefore, the
protection of administrative documents is a hot topic. Nu-
merous solutions have been proposed: watermarking, text
hash calculation [1] and copy sensitive codes [2].
Copy Sensitive Graphical Codes (CSGC) are a promising
solution for document support authentication. These codes
have been constructed to be sensitive to distortions added
by Print-and-Scan (P&S) process during each document re-
production. The P&S process is a stochastic process which
introduces changes that cannot be reproduced [3]. One of
the first commercialized CSGC was the Copy Detectable
Pattern (CDP) [2]. This is a black-and-white maximum en-
tropy image, generated using a secret key, that takes full
advantage of information loss principle during P&S pro-
cess. The authentication test performs the comparison of
the pixel values in the digital and in the scanned CDPs. This
solution resists to some attacks (duplication, estimation us-
ing inverse P&S model [4]). However, it was shown that
an attacker can produce a fake that fools the detector with
reasonable number of genuine goods [5].
Another CSGC is the Two Level QR (2LQR) code intro-
duced in [6]. This barcode stores the information in two
levels. The first level is readable by any standard barcode
reader, the second level can be accessible only for autho-
rized users who possess the specific reading application.
Additionally, the second level is sensitive to P&S process.
The second level, as well as the authentication capacity, is
offered by specific texture patterns, that are distinguished
one from another after P&S process and can be sensitive to
coping process. The authentication test is based on com-
parison of mean 2LQR code correlation value with pre-
determined threshold Th. The document is said to be au-
thentic if this mean value is bigger than Th. It was shown
that the 2LQR code can successfully resist to duplication
attack [7]. Additionally, the 2LQR code can resist sev-
eral naive attacks based on the use of some image process-
ing tools (histogram equalization, global image binarization
and sharpen enhancement) [8].
The 2LQR code second level encodes the information using
a q-ary (q ≥ 2) alphabet, which is composed of q different
textured patterns. The structure and the number q of these
textured patterns are kept as a secret for further authentica-
tion test but the limited number of letters in an alphabet can
1
be seen as a weakness. Due to this specific construction,
we can imagine a pattern estimation attack based on a big
number of samples: an opponent will use a big amount of
the same pattern (that can be extracted from a single code)
to estimate the original texture and then to reproduce the
document with this original-like graphical code. In this pa-
per, we want to discuss and suggest several basic opponent
strategies to forge the 2LQR code.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We intro-
duce the CSGC construction and the authentication process
challenge in Section 2. The suggested pattern estimation
methodology is discussed in Section 3. The binarization
strategies for textured pattern estimation are listed in Sec-
tion 3.2. We show and analyze the experimental results in
Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2. Challenge statement
In this section, we want to explain the specificity of the
2LQR code construction and introduce the authentication
and estimation processes from theoretical point of view.
2.1. Graphical code construction
As it was mentioned before the supplementary informa-
tion of 2LQR code is encoded using q different textured pat-
terns that are chosen according to some criteria introduced
in [6]. A specificity of the 2LQR code is to propose a new
data storage capacity linked to its sensitivity to P&S pro-
cess. These functionalities are based on the use of a finite
q-ary alphabet of textures: by definition the letters of the
alphabet are repeated and this repetition offers a new attack
way to opponents. During authentication test, we compare
each printed-and-scanned textured pattern (i.e. modules of
2LQR code) with original textured patterns and we test the
response of each of them, but an opponent can try to take
advantage of this pattern repetition to estimate globally the
textured patterns used in order to create an unauthorized
copy of a given 2LQR code.
The difference between CDP and textured patterns of 2LQR
code is that the CDP is composed of black-and-white pixel
squares that can be considered one by one (to store binary
information) or globally (to ensure support authenticity).
This one-by-one method to store information impacts the
precision of the devices used and or the reliability of the
process. On the other hand the elementary structure of a
2LQR code is a textured module in which several pixels are
either black or white. This textured module is used for both
functions at the same time: data storage and document au-
thentication.
Let U be a square image of size u × u pixels that is the
elementary piece of CDP image. Let P be a textured pat-
tern of size p×p pixels that represents the elementary piece
of 2LQR code. We illustrate the comparison of elementary
pieces of CDP and 2LQR code in Fig. 1. The smallest el-
ement of CDP image is an image U that is either black or
white, so all u2 pixels are equal to 0 or 255. In the same
time, the smallest element of 2LQR code is a textured pat-
tern that contains a frequent change of black (0) and white
(255) pixels. Thus the textured patterns have a more de-
tailed structure than the CDP elements.
Figure 1. The comparison of smallest elements of a) CDP and b)
2LQR code, and c) the impact of P&S process to these CSGC.
As shown in Fig. 1.c, due to P&S impact each element U of
CDP is spread over Λ × Λ area, where Λ = λ × u. In the
same time, each pixel of textured pattern P is influenced by
its neighbors so that a printed and scanned textured pattern
is spread over s × s area, where s = ω × p. However, in
practice, the value s is often equal to p or bigger just up to
one pixel. In this paper, we consider that s = p or s = 2×p
when the scanner resolution is twice bigger than the printer
resolution.
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Example of textured pattern: a) original version and b) its
printed version captured using ZEISS microscope with 5× magni-
fication.
In order to illustrate the crucial impact of P&S process on
textured patterns used in 2LQR code, we print one textured
pattern using common office printer with 600 dpi resolution
and magnified the printed pattern using ZEISS microscope
(5× magnification). Fig. 2.b illustrates the obtained image
that shows a noise added to each pixel of textured pattern.
We note that even with high resolution microscope we can-
not correctly predict the original texture of pattern.
2.2. Authentication process
The authentication is based on the comparison of origi-
nal CSGC image I with its degraded by P&S process CSGC
version Ĩ = I + NP + NS , where NP and NS are noises
added by authorized printer and scanner. The duplication
attack consists on two consecutive P&S operations so that
the duplicated CSGC image will be
˜̃I = I + NP + NS + NP + NS ,
when we suppose that the opponent has the same printer and
scanner as the authority center.
The authentication test measures the quantity of distortion
added to printed CSGC Ĩ in order to take a decision about
its authenticity. Therefore the authentication test can be for-
mulated as hypothesis test:
H0 : f(I, Ĩ) > Th,
H1 : f(I, Ĩ) < Th,
where f is any comparison function as a distance between
the images or a correlation value and Th is the distortion
threshold that was calculated in advance by the authority
center. The hypothesis H0 is valid when the printed CSGC
Ĩ comes from normal mode and thus is authentic. The hy-
pothesis H1 is valid when the original CSGC image was
duplicated (̃I = ˜̃I) or faked.
In the case of estimation attack, an opponent scans an orig-
inal printed CSGC Ĩ and then tries to estimate the CSGC
image Î that will be than equivalent to the original I. In this
case, the fake CSGC can probably pass the authentication
test as:
˜̂I = Î + NP + NS .
It was shown in [9] that an opponent can estimate the struc-
ture of CDP and produce a fake with reasonable number of
genuine CDP samples that will be considered as an origi-
nal by the authenticator. In this paper, we want to test the
close local strategies to estimate the structure of each tex-
tured pattern used for 2LQR code construction.
3. Estimation of copy-sensitive 2LQR code
The textured pattern redundancy in 2LQR code can make
easier its estimation. We suppose that an opponent can eas-
ily predict the dimension q used in 2LQR code, and then
s/he can use a classification test for textured pattern clas-
sification. These classes can be used then for pattern es-
timation. In this section we discuss several possible local
strategies for pattern estimation.
3.1. Collection of samples from 2LQR code
We suppose that the opponent has access to one or sev-
eral P&S samples of a 2LQR code and does not have the
original numeric patterns used for its generation. In this
case, the opponent needs to reconstruct each textured pat-
tern. For this s/he needs to extract the P&S samples of tex-
tured patterns that constitute the given P&S 2LQR code.
After, based on this dataset s/he can try to estimate the
structure of these textured patterns using several binariza-
tion techniques. Therefore, this falsification strategy con-
sists of textured pattern estimation using a big number of
samples. The flowchart of proposed estimation process is
presented in Fig. 3
Remark: we focus on pattern binarization because this pro-
cess is a key step in the printing process and can not be
avoid. Toner of common printers only deals with black and
white information: greyscale data is dithered by the printer
itself.
Figure 3. Considered estimation process. The patterns from P&S
2LQR code are classified in several classes. Then representative
candidates (for each class) are created by estimation and binariza-
tion methods. Finally, a fake 2LQR code is constructed and printed
by an opponent.
We suggest to use a k-mean clustering for pattern classi-
fication to q classes, where q is the dimension of the alpha-
bet used for private level encoding in the given 2LQR code.
Remark: we use the k-means clustering as it is an effective
classifier for our experiments and produces good classifica-
tions. Nevertheless, it can be replaced by any other clas-
sification/clustering method. After separation of textured
patterns into q classes, one of the binarization methods, dis-
cussed in following section, is applied for each class. Even
if these binarization methods will not reconstruct the exact
structure of the original textured patterns, the goal is to pass
the authentication test currently based on Pearson correla-
tion. So an opponent wants to respect the H0 hypothesis:
cor(I,
˜̂
I) > Th,
where Î is estimated 2LQR code with q estimated patters
Ei, i = 1, · · · , q.
3.2. Estimation methods
In this section we overview several binarization methods
to estimate the textured patterns after P&S process.
Let Si, i = 1, · · · , q be a printed-and-scanned version of
textured pattern Pi. Let Classi, i = 1, · · · , q be the set of
Ni textured patterns S
j
i , j = 1, · · · , Ni obtained after k-
mean clustering, Mi be the mean image of size s× s pixels
calculated using a set ofNi patterns S
j
i fromClassi andEi
be an estimated binary pattern of size p×p pixels that might
have the texture closed to Pi. In the rest of this section, we
use these sets of patterns for pattern estimation.
In the first type of methods, we binarize the image sets
Classi using one of the following thresholds:
• B1 method: th = (min(Classi) +max(Classi))/2;
• B2 method: th = 127;
• B3 method: th = median(Classi).
Then to construct Ei, the majority vote is applied for each
pixel position in textured pattern in order to decide if this
pixel is black or white.
In the second type of methods, we first calculate the mean
image (Mi) using each image from the Classi set and then,
each mean pattern Mi is binarized using one of the three
following thresholds:
• B4 method: thi = mean(Classi) - the mean value of
each image set is used as a th;
• B5 method: thi = mean(Mi) - the mean value of
calculated mean image is used as a th;
• B6 method: th = 127.
In the end we obtain the resulting binary pattern Ei.
However, the considered global thresholding methods can-
not correctly estimate the structure of textured pattern used
as the pixel values are influenced by its neighbor pixels (see
Fig. 1.c and Fig. 2.b). Therefore, we suggest methods that
take into account the frequency of pixel values and the rela-
tions between 4-connected pixels.
The third type (B7) of methods binarizes the image sets
using median value. Then for all pixels of one type (white
or black), we calculate the sum of normalized pixel val-
ues. More precisely, we normalize each element of the
class Classi in the interval [0, 1], and then we calculate
separately the sum of normalized values of white (black)
pixels Sw(m,n) (Sb(m,n)) using the binarization results,
where (m,n) is the pixel from textured pattern. Then if
Sw(m,n) > Sb(m,n), the pixel (m,n) of pattern Ei is
considered as a white pixel, otherwise it is a black pixel.
Algorithm 1 B7 binarization
Require: Classi, i = 1, . . . , q
1: Calculate th = median(Classi)
2: BClassi is a binarization of Classi using th
3: for each pixel (m,n) ∈ Ei do
4: p = normp(Ei(m,n))
5: if BClassji (m,n) is white then
6: Sw(m,n) = Sw(m,n) + p
7: else
8: Sb(m,n) = Sb(m,n) + (1− p)
9: end if
10: end for
11: for each pixel (m,n) ∈ Ei do
12: if Sw(m,n) > Sb(m,n) then
13: pixel (m,n) is white
14: else
15: pixel (m,n) is black
16: end if
17: end for
The algorithm of this estimation method is shown in Algo-
rithm 1.
The fourth type (B8) of methods is a modified version of
the previous one. Here, we consider not only the pixel but
its 4-connected neighbors; the sum of pixel values is re-
placed by the sum of pixel values of its 4-connected pixels.
Then these values are also normalized in the interval [0, 1]
and the sum of normalized values of white (black) pixels
Sw(m,n) (Sb(m,n)) using the binarization results is cal-
culated. Finally, the pixel of Ei is white, if Sw(m,n) >
Sb(m,n), otherwise the pixel is black.
4. Experimental results
In this section, we describe the database of 2LQR code
used, discuss the pattern estimation results and show the
authentication test results. Additionally, we present results
considering changes in P&S patterns used.
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Figure 4. Examples of 2LQR code and textured patterns: a) 2LQR
code, b) Pattern 1, c) Pattern 2, d) Pattern 3.
In our experiments, a version 2 of QR code (25 × 25 pat-
terns) is used. The alphabet dimension of private level is
q = 3. Therefore, we have more or less 85 textured patterns
of each type in every 2LQR code. The database is composed
of 30 P&S 2LQR codes. All 2LQR codes were printed with
a Brother HL-4150CDN printer and scanned with a Canon
LIDE210 scanner both with true 600 dpi black and white
resolution. We set such resolution due to its common use
for office printers. Fig. 4 illustrates a 2LQR code and tex-
tured patterns used.
As it was mentioned before the structure of textured pattern
is crucially changed after P&S process. An example of each
textured patterns after P&S is shown in Fig. 5. We can no-
tice that the initial structure of textured patterns can hardly
be recognized from these images.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. Examples of P&S 2LQR code and textured patterns: a)
P&S pattern 1, b) P&S pattern 2, c) P&S pattern 3.
We apply the suggested binarization methods for three
classes of textured patterns. We notice that the frequent
change of black and white pixels cannot be reconstructed by
the proposed binarization methods after P&S process. The
best reconstruction results can be obtained using method
B8. We illustrate the comparison of numerical original pat-
tern P1, its magnified view after printing process using a
microscope ZEISS, its printed-and-scanned version S1 and
its estimated version using B8 method in Fig. 6.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6. Examples of : a) Pattern P1, b) Pattern P1 printed in
600dpi and captured using microscope, c) Printed-and-scanned
pattern S1, d) Estimated using B8 method pattern E1.
4.1. Authentication results
As the final goal of the opponent is to fool the fake detec-
tion process, we use the authentication test as an indicator
of reconstruction quality. The binarized patterns are used to
regenerate the fake 2LQR codes, that are then printed using
the same printer and scanner in 600 dpi resolution. These
codes as well as the original 2LQR codes are tested to evalu-
ate their authenticity. The correlation values for each 2LQR
code (original or fake) are calculated. These correlation re-
sults for 30 samples are illustrated in Fig. 7. We note that the
fake 2LQR codes have significantly smaller correlation val-
ues (0.15− 0.25) in comparison with originals that have in
average correlation value equals to 0.35. With a classic au-
thentication threshold set to Th = 0.28−0.3, no fake 2LQR
code can pass the authentication test. All unauthorized du-
plication and falsifications of documents are detected (false
positive rate is zero). Taking into account the fact that
Figure 7. Comparison of correlation values for faked 2LQR code
printed-and-scanned at 600 dpi resolution.
Figure 8. Comparison of correlation values for faked 2LQR code
printed-and-scanned at 1200 dpi resolution.
the opponent can use higher resolution for fake code gener-
ation, we drive a test with 2LQR code printed-and-scanned
with true one-channel 1200 dpi resolution. The results show
that using specific attacks (B6-B8 for example) an opponent
can reproduce a 2LQR code without destructing the stored
information that remain readable. On the other hand, in-
creasing the resolution is not enough to fake the anti-copy
test: the reproduced code is still detected as a copy (see
Fig. 8).
4.2. Estimation results vs number of samples used
In this section we want to show some results of pattern
estimation depending on code number used for this estima-
tion. We construct several fake 2LQR codes in order to ver-
ify the authentication test robustness against these attacks.
In the first experiment, three and ten samples of 2LQR
codes were used for estimation of textured patterns using
B8 method. These samples were printed and scanned us-
ing the same devices in 600 dpi resolution. The correlation
values of these two estimations for 30 fake 2LQR codes are
shown in Fig. 9, violet and yellow boxes. We note that the
increased number of 2LQR code samples does not improve
the estimation results. The correlation values are almost the
same and thus the fake codes cannot pass the authentica-
tion test. Analogically, we change the number of 2LQR
Figure 9. Comparison of correlation values, when changing the
number of 2LQR codes.
code samples from 3 to 30 for pattern estimation and use
the B3 binarization method. The correlation values of these
two sets of fake codes are illustrated in Fig. 9, green and
red boxes. As in previous example, increasing the number
of 2LQR codes cannot improve the textured pattern estima-
tion results. The correlation values are also close to each
other and cannot help to pass the authentication test with
pre-defined threshold.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we suggest several opponent strategies to
estimate the textured pattern structure and we evaluate the
resistance of the 2LQR code. These methods are based on
statistical values, majority vote and 4-connected pixels. The
results estimated on many codes show that the initial struc-
ture of the textured patterns used cannot be reconstructed
using such binarization methods. The obtained results show
that the constructed fake 2LQR codes cannot pass the au-
thentication test even after a partial reconstruction codes.
Increase the number of samples does not seem to improve
the quality of the reconstructed patterns: noise considera-
tion may not be sufficient. In future work we want to find
the breaking point in the authentication process of a 2LQR
code: finding such a limit will allow us to ensure an au-
thentication capacity considering initial conditions. With
this same goal, we want to study another security aspects of
2LQR codes by increasing the image resolution with super-
resolution methods and by using more precise estimations
based on optimization methods.
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